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Abstract 
By drawing on Ukrainian experience, this paper analyzes the anatomy of bank efficiency in a 
transitional economy. Acknowledging the vast disparities in the business technology of different 
size banks, in this comprehensive study, we innovatively estimate group-specific (distinct) 
frontiers for small, medium, and large size banks. The results from separate frontiers reveal that 
Ukrainian banks record 38% technical inefficiency, 26% pure technical inefficiency, and 17% 
scale inefficiency on average. Apparently, banks in transition waste about the two fifths of their 
factor inputs during the production of financial services. The cardinal source of sub-performance 
in transitional banks seems to be managerial inefficiencies. We also found that banks operating in 
areas with more political influence and more developed infrastructure outperform the banks 
operating in politically and economically weaker regions. The results also indicate that larger 
banks, enjoying public trust in a risky business climate, dominate smaller banks in all forms of 
efficiency. However, such bias for size causes large banks to suffer from decreasing returns to 
scale and small banks from idle capacity. Consequently, the policies promoting consolidation 
between small and large banks may alleviate the excess (idle) capacity for large (small) banks in 
a transitional economy.  
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Introduction 
The significance of financial industry development and privatization received renewed attention in the 
context of economic restructuring of transition economies. Over the last two decades, the banking sectors 
in the post-Soviet transition economies have gradually evolved from the traditional mono-bank system of 
the central-planning period to a Western-style, geographically and sectorally diversified, two-tiered system 
of today. New financial markets, institutions, and channels of intermediation have been established almost 
from scratch. The governments of transitional economies spent enormous amounts of resources to develop 
a competitive and efficient banking system based on market principles (Yildirim and Phillipatos, 2002; Kyj 
and Isik, 2008; Fang et al., 2011). The road to a market economy for former Soviet bloc countries has 
required significant economic and political transformation. Some countries have quickly instituted reforms 
and attracted the necessary foreign investments for growth and development. Others have been less 
successful in increasing the transparency of their policies and financial institutions and have been less 
attractive to foreign investors. With a low level of foreign investment and undeveloped capital markets, 
some transition countries have had to rely to a significant degree on their own bank-based financial 
systems for investment capital. Ukraine, with an unsteady history of both economic and legal reforms, has 
had one of the lowest levels of foreign capital investments and has had to rely on its own internal sources 
of financing.1  
When compared to other countries in Eastern and Central Europe, Ukraine has many more banks. Thus, 
one can expect that the existence of many banks may lead to greater competition and augmented degrees 
of efficiency. Although the Ukrainian banking system is different from most banking markets, given  the 
large number of banks in existence, the Ukrainian bank market is similar to other transition economies in 
that the market in Ukraine is narrow and shallow; market participants for financial products have been few; 
information imperfections are substantial, regulations are inadequate and often have been used for 
purposes other than the soundness of the financial system. Banks in transition economies usually face 
issues that revolve around competition from better-capitalized foreign banks since these banks have 
access to inexpensive capital, technology, and more developed customer relations.  This has not been the 
case in Ukraine since foreign penetration into the Ukrainian bank market has been low and segmented, 
servicing mostly foreign customers. Bank markets in transition and emerging economies also differ 
considerably from those in industrialized economies. For instance, in most transitional countries, institutions 
are limited in number and type, thus competition is weak; capital markets are narrow and shallow; market 
participants for financial products are few; information imperfections are substantial, thus transaction costs 
are high; regulations are inadequate and often used for other purposes than the soundness of the financial 
system; and the underlying economies are relatively poor and unsophisticated. In addition, banking sectors 
of these economies are highly concentrated. It is possible that banks of concentrated markets become less 
motivated to operate efficiently and productively, as they do not face strong competition from new banks 
and non-bank financial institutions. The lack of developed money and capital markets also provides comfort 
for banks of transition countries, as “disintermediation” from depositors and borrowers does not threaten 
their business as in developed markets. Hence, studies from different regulatory environments and market 
structures may let us learn the impact of these differences on bank performance. 
Two cross-country studies (Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Fries and Taci, 2005) found Ukrainian banks to be 
among the least efficient ones. Grigorian and Manole (2002) covered 17 Eastern European countries and 
found significant positive correlations between cost efficiency and GDP per capita and banking market 
concentration. Fries and Taci (2005) covered 15 post-communist countries (including Ukraine), and found 
that the level of overall economic development is not significantly related to costs. Their study included a 
range of countries from Ukraine with a per capita GDP of US$750 to Slovenia with US$9441. Although 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2002) do not include Ukraine they found a significant positive association between 
bank costs and real GDP growth. They also found that large banks in transition economies operate in a 
relatively more competitive environment compared to small banks. Competition is lower in local markets 
                                                             
1 According to Serhij Tyhypko, the President of the National Bank of Ukraine in 2003, as late as in 2003 the expectation was that the 
Ukrainian banking system would provide 52.4 billion UAH in credit to business enterprises in Ukraine, and only 4.2 billion UAH would 
come in as foreign investments.  
Isik et al. / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 5 No 3, 2016  
ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Pa
ge
3 
compared to national and international markets. In a country specific study, Mertens and Urga (2001) 
evaluated the development of the Ukrainian banking system using a one-year sample (the crisis year 1998) 
and found that small banks were more cost and scale efficient but less profit efficient than large banks. In 
their multivariate regression analysis, Kyj and Isik (2008) found that foreign banks with local partners 
outperform other organizational formats in terms of managerial and scale x-efficiency. They also observed 
that many small banks are in need of immediate growth to reap economies of scale. They accordingly 
suggested consolidation policies in the market through mergers and acquisitions to improve the operational 
performance of the banking industry in Ukraine. In a recent working paper, Pylypiv (2011) measuring a 
single efficiency index, namely input efficiency, tried to understand what determines the variations in this 
index and the causes of failures among the Ukrainian banks. She found that input efficiency declined from 
2004 to 2007 and then improved from 2008 to 2010. She also reported that foreign banks and small banks 
are more likely to fail.  
Although Ukrainian banks are very small by world standards, there are major differences in their purpose. 
Some have developed from the old Soviet system banks while other, so-called “pocket banks”, are newly 
established to service specific clients. Most of the above-mentioned studies, including the Mertens and 
Urga (2001), Kyj and Isik (2008) and Pylypiv (2011) studies, employ a standard approach and construct 
common frontiers. The results of a common frontier approach may be difficult to interpret in cases where 
banks operate in different environments, or banks of different size have different objectives or employ 
different production technologies (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1992; Isik et al., 2016a, b). We examine the 
productive efficiency performance of Ukrainian banks during the mid-transition period (1998-2003) by 
employing a highly flexible non-stochastic approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and consider the 
technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies of Ukrainian banks by forming separate frontiers for the 
small, medium, and large sized Ukrainian banks. Because Ukraine gained its independence in 1991 from 
the Soviet Union in the aftermath of its dissolution at the end of the Cold War, we purposefully selected this 
mid-transition period to allow the country to overcome the initial tumultuous years of transition to a market 
economy from a command economy.  Also, we wished to give enough time to its banking industry to 
season and mature, because one goal of this paper is to examine the association between bank 
performance and experience as measured by the age of banking firms. Furthermore, the period that 
greeted the new millennium, especially after the so-called Orange Revolution in 2005, is characterized with 
political and economic disruptions, social unrests, and regional wars, which could hamper a sound and 
reliable performance analysis. After all, in a highly risky business environment, the efficiency of banks 
should be of a lesser concern for both state and populace, as one cannot expect smooth functioning from a 
banking industry, whose survival is critically dependent upon law and order.  
Literature Review 
Ukrainian Banks during her Transition to the Market Economy 
Being part of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine had no tradition of an independent banking system even on 
the level of other central and east European countries. Before 1989, the Soviet banking system consisted 
of republican branch banks of the main soviet banks.2 Between 1989 and 1991 an attempt was made in the 
Soviet Union to separate commercial banking from the Central Bank by allowing the creation of a number 
of small commercial banks and credit cooperatives. Ukraine’s banking system began its new independent 
era in 1991; during that year, the Ukrainian branch of Central Bank of the Soviet Union, Hosbank, was 
reorganized as the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) and the initial Law of Ukraine (“On Banks and Banking 
Activities”) was hastily adopted. Initially the general license for banking operations and a license for foreign 
currency transactions was all that was required. Over the years the law has gone through numerous 
amendments (February 1, 1996; January 17, 2001; September 20, 2001; November 28, 2002; February 6, 
2003; May 22, 2003; June 5, 2003; November 20, 2003; June 22, 2004). Initially no specific permits were 
required to conduct various operations. Capital requirements were very low and no oversight was 
conducted to determine the sources of capital. As a result, by 1995 the NBU had registered 238 banks.  
                                                             
2 The main Soviet banks were headquartered in Moscow with a branch in each of the 15 republics. 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the Ukrainian banking industry for 1998 to 2003. Although still at 
very low levels, total assets in real terms have grown almost six-fold during this six-year period. On the 
other hand, equity has not kept up, falling from 23% to 13% of total assets. Individual deposits have caught 
up with business deposits reflecting the growth in the economy and/or that the relationship based banking 
is steadily building up trust among the population. As interest income has decreased, commission income 
has increased. The inflation from 1992 to 1995, during which banks were allowed to borrow long from the 
NBU and to lend short, and the multiple exchange rate in these years resulted in banks earning well above-
normal profits. This resulted in hundreds of banks being established, with 238 having been established by 
January 1995, and 311 by early 2004. Many of the banks were established by enterprises for the purpose 
of servicing those enterprises. The pace has slowed down considerably with only 15 new banks being 
established in the five-year span from 2000 to 2004. One of the most important and initially profitable 
assets for Ukrainian banks had been their state debt-holdings. Until 1998, this had provided good earnings 
for banks. However, when yields began to drop in 1998, the government stopped payments to commercial 
banks and restructured its obligations by extending their maturities, which resulted in banks losing a 
significant portion of their liquid assets  (Andronov, 1998: 60).  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the Ukrainian banking industry during transition 
 
All of the banks in Ukraine are considered very small by world standards. The group of “large” banks is 
made up of former state banks reorganized from the corresponding Soviet banks, and commercial banks 
that had their start in 1989 or the early nineties. In the 1990s many of these banks had a special 
relationship with the government: namely they were required to make loans to the state enterprises that 
had not yet been privatized and they held most of the government debt.3 These banks provided most of the 
                                                             
3 Large banks, especially system banks, have been closely linked to the government. Through the 1990s they contracted with the 
government to service budgetary receipts and payments. This line of business has decreased or ended for many with the 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Average TA (in 000s) 119701.11 157932.88 231805.71 310551.47 406981.16 638435.41 
No of banks 179 161 153 152 157 157 
No of branches - - - 1447 1527 1538 
Asset Str (% TA)       
Loans/TA 0.43 0.42 0.48 0.68 0.73 0.62 
Investments/TA 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.04 
Liability Str (% TA)       
Deposits/TA 0.37 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.61 0.67 
Business dep/TA 0.22 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.31 - 
Individual dep/TA 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.30 - 
Equity/TA 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.13 
Income Str (% TA)       
Revenue/TA 0.31 0.33 0.26 0.21 0.16 - 
Interest inc/TA 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.11 - 
Commision inc/TA 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 - 
Currency inc/TA 0.04 0.06 - - - - 
Expense Str (% TA)       
Expenses/TA 0.29 0.31 0.26 0.20 0.15 - 
Interest exp/TA 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.06 - 
Commission exp/TA 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 - 
Currency exp/TA 0.02 0.02 - - - - 
Labor exp/TA 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 
Profitability Str       
Net interest inc/TA 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 
Net commis inc/TA 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
ROA 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ROE 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.06 
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long-term credits to businesses in Ukraine, with half of the credits being extended to government 
enterprises. Many of the “small” banks do not serve the general public but are so called ”pocket banks” 
founded by the owners of enterprises with the purpose of servicing their firms or the owners’ interests. 
Licensing requirements, liquidations procedures, and capital requirements were established. In 1998, IAS 
were approved and required for the banking sector. The initial minimum capital requirement in the national 
currency was the equivalent of 500,000 USD, but the hyperinflation that began in 1993 led to the eventual 
devaluation of initial paid in capital to 3,000 USD in 1995. Although the NBU kept raising the capital 
requirement, existing banks were allowed to continue operations without meeting these requirements. By 
1995 the paid in capital of 95% of the banks was below the minimum requirement. In these early days, 
characterized by minimal regulation,, multiple exchange rates and large differences between the rates that 
commercial banks received on loans and the rates paid on deposits, banking in Ukraine was extremely 
lucrative (see Table 2). Speculation of banks during those years led the Ukrainian Parliament in 1996 to 
amend the Banking Law in order to strengthen the NBU’s regulatory powers.4 With (Resolution of the 
Parliament of Ukraine #24/96-AD) Instruction No. 10, new licensing requirements, capital requirements, risk 
criteria and liquidations procedures were established. The capital requirement for new entrants was raised 
to ECU 1,000,000.  For existing banks the requirements were much more lenient and a time line was 
extended by which they were required to reach the necessary capital: €100,000 by June 1, 1996; €250,000 
by October 1, 1996; €500,000 by January 1, 1997; €750,000 by July 1, 1997; and €1,000,000 by January 
1, 1998. The revision to the law impacting banks in January 2001 increased the capital requirements to €3 
million for banks operating in one administrative region and to EUR million for banks operating throughout 
the country.  
Together with these requirements, the NBU was given the right/ability to issue separate licenses for 
different banking operations and was authorized to withdraw operating licenses from banks that did not 
meet the capital requirements. However, the increased regulation did not solve the problems with the 
existing commercial banks, since the capital requirement was postponed for a year and exemptions were 
granted to existing banks. Pressure from regional politicians resulted in postponements being granted to 
some small regional banks that were unable to meet the minimum capital requirements or risk criteria, but 
most of these banks ultimately entered liquidation. Pressure from the central government led to 
postponements being granted to the former state banks (eight of which had been privatized) that had and 
were granting loans to state enterprises and other large banks with networks throughout the country. Small 
banks that were associated with large private firms were refused a grace period and had to come up with 
the capital requirements or their licenses were revoked. Interestingly, the higher capital requirements did 
not result in many consolidations.  
Table 2: Commercial banks annual interest rates 
Year On loans On deposits 
1992 76 68 
1993 221.1 187.3 
1994 201.7 171.0 
1995 107.1 64.2 
1996 77 34.3 
1997 49.1 18.2 
1998 54.4 22.9 
1999 53.6 20.8 
2000 40.3 13.5 
2001 31.9 11.2 
2002 24.8 7.8 
2003 17.7 7.8 
Source: Bulletin National Bank of Ukraine, March 2005 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
establishment of the State Treasury. However, budgetary and NBU funds still made up from 9-16% of the liabilities of the system 
banks from 1998 – 2002, with these banks holding between 75%(1998, 2002) to 85% (1999) of these funds from 1998 to 2002. 
4 Early transition years also saw many foreign undercapitalized banks of questionable reputations that folded by 1998. 
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Large banks were also the main losers from the decline in the Treasury bill market and devaluation of the 
national currency (hryvna) following the Russian bank crisis in 1998 and when legislation was enacted 
creating a moratorium on the seizing of collateral assets of state enterprises or enterprises that were 
partially owned by the state. Since foreign banks did not issue loans to Ukrainian banks, they did not have 
significant loans outstanding in August 1998 like the Russian banks did; however, Ukrainian banks did 
accept deposits in US dollars and provided credit to firms in foreign currency. The devaluation of the 
currency caused deterioration on many firms’ balance sheets, making it difficult for the firms to repay their 
loans, which resulted in bad loans (37.8% as of August 1, 1998) on the balance sheets of Ukrainian banks 
(Kovtun, 1998: 1). As a result of the events of 1998, the “large” banks in Ukraine suffered the most. 
However, the tightening regulations required a much larger capital requirement for “small” banks. This can 
be seen in the differences between the composition of bank assets, liabilities and capital for the different 
sized banks in Table 3.  
In 2003, equity to total assets of large, medium, and small banks were 11 percent, 21 percent, and 44 
percent respectively. When compared to differences that exist among US commercial banks, these 
capitalization differences are much more significant (e.g.; 8%, 11% and 13% for the large, medium, and 
small US banks, respectively). Capitalization, the equity ratio (EqTA) measures both how well capitalized 
the banks are and how risky they are. Empirical studies usually found that well capitalized firms are more 
efficient (Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2002 and 2003). These size differences may play a 
role in defining bank efficiency. We posit that the Ukrainian banking system, although consisting of a 
relatively large number of banks, actually consisted of banks with different objectives that employed 
different production techniques and were treated differently by the NBU. Their cost structures are different 
and they should be analyzed separately, just as investment banks, commercial banks and savings banks in 
western economies are analyzed separately; a critical treatment discussed further below. 
The Need for Separate Efficient Frontiers for Comparisons of Different Size Banks 
Different sized banks may not be providing the same products or servicing the same type of customers. In 
fact, the banking literature reports several differences between large and small banks in the nature of their 
businesses (Aly et al., 1990; Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2002 and 2003; Isik et al., 2016b), 
which proclaim certain operational advantages for larger bank: 
1. Large banks have more diversified portfolio of services. They serve many different markets, 
foreign or domestic, and offer more different services. Thus, they do not solely depend on a 
specific sector or a product as a source of revenue, which makes them more resilient against 
possible economic shocks. 
2. Large banks are usually able to raise funds at lower cost. Unlike small banks, they have better 
access to various financial markets both abroad and inside. Besides, because of their well-
diversified assets, they may carry less equity, which is difficult and expensive to obtain. 
3. Large banks attract more astute management due to the resources available to them. 
4. Large banks can invest in advanced technology and update their aging technology better than 
small banks. Because such investments are expensive, they require large transaction volume and 
customer base to validate the large costs. 
5. Large banks usually operate in metropolitan areas, where competitive pressures are greater. 
Small banks usually operate in rural areas, small towns, and cities.  
6. Large banks may utilize economies of scale opportunities because as the volume of bank outputs 
increases, the per unit costs decline.  
7. Small banks tend to specialize in retail banking, while large banks tend to specialize in wholesale 
banking.  
8. Small banks possess less complex organizational charts than large banks, thus, the internal 
relations in small banks are usually less formal. Large banks are red tape dominated to ensure the 
span of control.   
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Table 3: Average common sized balance sheets for Ukrainian banks in 2003 
Balance Sheet Items Large Banks Medium Banks Small Banks 
Cash and balances with the NBU 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Securities for refinancing with NBU 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Due from other banks 0.14 0.15 0.16 
Assets held in trading securities 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Loans  0.65 0.61 0.53 
Investment securities 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Fixed and intangible assets 0.05 0.08 0.09 
Accounts Receivable 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Other assets 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total assets 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Deposits of other banks 0.18 0.15 0.08 
Deposits of clients 0.67 0.60 0.41 
Other deposits 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Debt securities issued by the Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Accrued expenses 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Other liabilities 0.02 0.03 0.06 
Total liabilities 0.89 0.79 0.55 
Share capital 0.06 0.15 0.38 
Treasury stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Issue difference 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Reserves and other Bank’s funds 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Revaluation of intangible assets 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Retained earnings 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Total equity capital 0.11 0.21 0.45 
 Total liabilities and equity capital 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Because we do not know the technology (frontier) of the fully efficient firms in theory, we need to estimate it 
from the observations in practice. To this end, we compare all banks to the best practice banks on the 
frontier. A common frontier assumes similar technologies and products across banks. However, the 
purpose of providing investment capital and servicing to its owners, combined with different bank 
requirements, can result in different best practices isoquants for different sized banks.  
A common frontier approach becomes difficult to interpret as the common frontier might then be miss-
specified giving rise to biased estimates of bank efficiency. In a comparison analysis of performance, data 
should only be pooled and efficiency measures calculated relative to a common frontier only when large 
and small banks share the same operating characteristics - legal treatment, goal, technology, 
organizational structure, culture, etc. However, as the banking literature suggests and as we saw in the 
previous section, the size of a bank (measured by its assets, deposits, or equity) can have a highly 
significant effect on its nature of business. Hence, when comparing the financial or operational 
performance of banking firms with one another, it is best to compare the banks of similar size. Similar size 
banks tend to offer the same or similar services, thus, one can be more confident that performance 
analyses have some validity.  
As a result, some bank studies have attempted to figure out the average cost and efficiency for smaller 
banks separately from the cost and efficiency calculations for larger banks (Berger et al., 1987; Berger et 
al., 1993, Guzman, 2000; Hassan et al., 2010; Isik et al., 2016a, b). Although all banks in Ukraine can be 
classified as very small banks by world standards, as aforementioned, significant differences exist between 
relatively large and small banks in Ukraine in terms of organizational form, production location, service 
menu, and branching. As a matter of fact, Havrylchyk (2006) in her study of the Polish banking industry 
found efficiency scores for pure technical and scale efficiency to be significantly lower when using the 
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common frontier as compared to those for separate frontier when comparing domestic and foreign banks 
for the period 1997-2001.  
Given these reasons, as a kind of unique treatment, we estimate a separate frontier for large, medium, and 
small banks for each year under study (1998-2003). So, every year, we compare every size bank to its own 
group specific frontier to avoid the challenge of comparing the “Davids” to “Goliaths” of banking. For this 
study, to estimate separate efficient frontier, we opted to use a highly flexible non-parametric frontier 
approach, an input-orientated DEA technique, to measure the technical efficiency scores of the Ukrainian 
banks.  
The DEA linear programming model estimates a non-stochastic envelopment frontier over the data points 
such that all observed points lie on or below the frontier. Thus the frontier represents the set of best-
practice observations for which no other decision making unit or linear combination of units employs as little 
or less of every input without changing the output quantities or produces as much or more of every output 
without altering the input quantities used.  
Total technical efficiency (TE) includes both pure technical efficiency (PME) and scale efficiency (SE); that 
is, efficient level of both inputs and outputs. Figure 2 illustrates the decomposition of TE into its 
components for one input (L: Labor) and one output (FA: Financial Assets). If we assume that all sizes of 
banks share the same technology and enjoy constant returns to scale (CRS), hence face no scale 
inefficiencies, we obtain the CRS frontier [0mtn]. If we relax the assumption of CRS, we attain the VRS 
frontier [prstuv] by assuming that banks may operate with variable returns to scale (VRS) due to some 
scale problems resulting from financial or market constraints. Let’s assume that a small bank operates at 
point f. Adopting the input orientation, technical efficiency at point f is given by km/kf with respect to the 
CRS frontier and by ks/kf with respect the VRS frontier.5  
The former index is called technical efficiency (TE), the latter is called pure technical efficiency (PTE) in the 
literature. However, while the point s on the VRS common frontier is deemed technically efficient, it is not 
scale efficient. This production level is an incorrect scale for cost minimization. Scale efficiency (SE) 
represents a proportional reduction in input usage if the bank can attain the optimum production level 
where there are constant returns to scale (CRS). Thus, if the bank can move from point f to s, it eliminates 
its pure managerial inefficiency, but if it can also move from point s to m, it also eradicates its scale 
inefficiency. Thus, SE=km/ks. It follows that TE=PTE*SE, i.e.; (km/kf) = (ks/kf) * (km/ks).  
On the other hand, if technologies (frontiers) of small and large banks are not the same, the efficiency 
measures for each group of banks have to be computed relative to a separate frontier constructed for that 
particular group. To illustrate the difference, consider the VRS frontiers in Figure 1, where prstuv and abtc 
represent the frontiers based on pooled (VRS common) and separate (VRS separate) frontiers 
respectively. The TE of bank f relative to these frontiers can be measured respectively as: TE (common) = 
ks/kf and TE (separate) = kb/kf.  
For the common and separate frontiers to be identical (coincide), the probability distribution functions of TE 
(common) and TE (separate) should coincide. However, given the reasons discussed above, there is a 
significant probability that banks of different sizes have distinct technology. Hence, in this study, we 
construct a separate frontier for small, medium, and large bank groups and compare each bank to its 
relative group specific frontier. For the least and the most efficient units in the sample, the efficiency 
indexes attain values between 0 and 1, respectively.  
 
 
                                                             
5 Technical efficiency (TE) measures whether a bank employs the minimum amount of inputs to produce a given amount of outputs, 
or, conversely, whether a bank produces the maximum level of outputs given fixed amount of inputs, as compared to banks operating 
on the efficient frontier. “Pure” technical efficiency (PTE) indicates a proportional reduction in input usage if inputs are not wasted 
given the current production level, which may be scale inefficient. Scale efficiency (SE) refers to a proportional reduction in input 
usage if the bank can attain the optimum production level, in which there are constant returns to scale (CRS). Thus, total TE includes 
both PTE and SE, that is to say, inefficient levels of both inputs and outputs. 
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Figure 1: Technical efficiency measures under common and separate frontiers 
Table 4: Sample selection for the efficiency measurement of the Ukrainian commercial banks 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total # of observations 179 159 153 152 157 157 
Eliminations       
UkrEximBank 1 1 1 1 1 1 
One-year old banks 5 1 - 3 5 4 
Zero inputs 27 7 5 4 3 1 
     Personnel expense 26 5 5 2 1 - 
     Funds 1 2 - 2 2 1 
Zero outputs (both) 1 1 1 - - - 
Net # of observations 145 149 146 144 148 151 
 
Research and Methodology 
It should be noted that although the above points regarding the performance of different sizes of banks 
have some merits, they should be empirically tested. They are just a priori (ex ante) true statements. 
Therefore, we test the following hypotheses employing a non-stochastic frontier approach, the DEA 
technique using separate frontiers:  
H1: Within its group size, technical, pure technical, and scale efficiencies of large banks have increased 
since 1998. 
H2: Because large banks operate in a more competitive environment, technical efficiency and pure 
technical efficiencies within this group are higher.  
H3: There is no difference in scale efficiency among the different sized banks in Ukraine when separate 
frontiers are employed.    
In order to measure bank efficiency and test the above hypotheses, we obtained balance sheet and 
profit/loss data from the NBU either directly or from Visnyk, a financial publication of the NBU, and from 
Financovi Ryski.  Ownership data was purchased from a consulting firm in Ukraine. Except for the two state 
banks, Oshchadny Bank (savings) and UkrExImbank (foreign trade), all banks are considered private 
banks. As summarized in Table 4, for the six-year period, 957 observations were available; however, we 
excluded the two state banks, banks with missing data, and one-year old banks because they have quite 
erratic behavior and may not be in full operation in the first year.  
That left 883 observations that met our criteria for inclusion in this study. For each year the number of 
banks available was divided into three groups: large, medium, and small.6 We model Ukrainian banks as 
multi-input and multi-output firms. There exist two approaches about what constitutes the inputs and 
outputs of banks in practice. 
                                                             
6 Descriptive statistics on the composition of bank balance sheet statements  (percentage mix of bank sources and uses of funds for 
year-end 2003) are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 5. Summary statistics of outputs and inputs for the Ukrainian banks during transition 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  All  
  Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev 
All                
 Loans 57825 179065 67231 185432 112149 263260 207067 456682 299403 711381 397345 981348 191284 565841 
 Securities 11758 39901 12122 43109 12603 37276 29632 151090 28488 128408 24545 58825 19865 88879 
 Funds 80749 226956 107729 278035 172064 425188 223459 567941 333191 807172 539920 1304177 244507 725274 
 Capital 13913 56582 16019 58893 19986 63875 23138 64722 30366 78196 39619 99702 23930 72409 
 Labor 4889 19139 5153 19662 7472 25768 10825 37872 13230 44427 15713 49765 9578 35116 
Size                
LARGEB Loans 159982 286763 178075 295115 286826 408329 517457 696372 760562 1104780 1030579 1526074 492489 911147 
 Securities 30802 65475 30916 71855 32511 60434 82027 255348 75577 216842 56901 93828 51505 149536 
 Funds 224441 355108 294944 429657 458672 656939 584625 883012 869616 1245223 1427369 1998045 648230 1159412 
 Capital 38076 94320 42100 98091 51141 105178 57583 104205 74960 124601 97257 158292 60429 117335 
 Labor 13252 31855 13921 32774 19779 42584 28404 62308 34987 72874 41098 81112 25343 57930 
MEDIUMB Loans 10780 6536 19713 11017 38539 17030 76080 25698 111291 33421 132062 46894 64781 53164 
 Securities 3605 5604 3729 4556 3877 4662 4651 5784 6522 7441 11084 10427 5594 7197 
 Funds 16424 9398 26802 13073 51957 16229 65881 25357 112493 34138 167289 57791 73660 60709 
 Capital 2867 4098 4563 5232 6695 5421 7963 6489 11890 10610 16645 14623 8454 9724 
 Labor 1069 685 1146 813 2071 1822 2821 2424 3695 2774 4867 3475 2613 2611 
SMALLB Loans 3693 2061 6121 4335 14645 7965 27664 13019 31817 18637 36608 23669 20225 18850 
 Securities 1036 1304 2098 2668 1826 2621 2220 3361 3868 5674 6021 8286 2876 4913 
 Funds 2723 2278 5187 4194 11412 7882 19872 11833 23780 18757 35197 27618 16511 18762 
 Capital 1025 1550 1914 2453 2758 3110 3867 4273 4771 5177 5633 5365 3350 4216 
 Labor 426 272 566 321 816 584 1250 1046 1253 856 1458 1001 966 835 
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Table 5 (Cont’d) Summary statistics of outputs and inputs for the Ukrainian banks during transition 
 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  All  
 Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev 
Ownership               
DOMPUR
E 
Loans 59800 188327 73452 201779 112154 279253 200153 481419 285223 746270 370067 102803
6 
190130 603384 
 Securitie
s 
12556 44815 13352 48547 12946 40385 32730 164202 29037 135851 22926 59710 20919 96859 
 Funds 86429 245006 119961 304437 175642 452959 216755 599346 319550 847662 488572 131610
7 
242191 756868 
 Capital 14957 61262 17527 64494 20865 67890 22529 65886 30630 81493 37119 98934 24391 75372 
 Labor 5406 20809 5577 21363 7720 27112 10968 39568 13802 47061 14643 49691 9906 36950 
DOMMAJ Loans 162397 297235 112732 221748 150544 280929 239377 409064 251627 268692 310654 310372 199696 295849 
 Securitie
s 
19893 30584 13549 18652 13319 21135 22677 49267 31925 57871 35956 40386 21947 37678 
 Funds 185990 319691 164839 297559 245200 452921 269170 499328 295631 356762 432673 449684 258704 391743 
 Capital 51015 96687 32174 68185 36135 73142 45479 93227 36889 70133 50826 82976 41029 75879 
 Labor 15770 31743 10746 25436 14399 33661 18700 44611 10044 15832 15014 19721 14135 29585 
FORMAJ Loans 14294 9243 56259 36124 145192 120350 374304 82401 503810 187326 540266 248224 347821 261031 
 Securitie
s 
5542 6153 14055 17369 5918 7643 8398 9585 21971 15718 49624 68535 23388 40656 
 Funds 24485 32419 52822 8149 155143 137281 365021 121365 520366 184931 702403 341247 400549 329782 
 Capital 6718 8398 10698 7512 13565 6867 30437 24452 36434 30840 47987 35711 30025 28464 
 Labor 1685 2114 2375 1846 3748 1891 7433 4875 9550 9128 12984 9993 7888 7842 
FORPUR
E 
Loans 30658 58077 55818 58221 158563 138777 321280 270121 528465 431068 695237 742958 302400 438707 
 Securitie
s 
18922 16809 8961 15273 5368 11943 8185 10947 16850 23001 9119 13075 11119 15306 
 Funds 51059 73746 87524 83491 191978 150085 358707 357194 550066 456601 825236 822423 350005 490728 
 Capital 3923 2052 7092 7060 5805 3502 10878 9841 12958 13208 15336 14665 9431 9944 
 Labor 2117 1099 3607 691 4444 1569 5783 3459 6908 3341 9484 4077 5451 3528 
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The production approach views banks as firms producing services - such as performing transactions and 
processing loan applications considers deposits as output. Noting that the process requires only physical 
inputs, such as labor and capital, the input vector (and thus total costs) should be exclusive of deposits 
(and related expenses). The intermediation approach considers deposits as inputs since it views banks as 
the conduit of funds between depositors and borrowers. Banks employ labor, capital, and deposits in their 
intermediation function. Thus, the input vector (and total costs) should include deposits (and related 
expenses in addition to operation costs). Because of the unavailability of data on the number of deposit and 
loan accounts, we adopted the intermediation approach when defining bank inputs and outputs in this 
study.7    
Accordingly, under the intermediation approach, our output vector includes total loans and investment 
portfolio, whereas the input vector encompasses funds, capital, and labor. Total loans output incorporates 
all types of lending activities (both commercial/industrial credits and individual loans). Investment portfolio 
output contains other earning assets of banks such as marketable (public and private) securities. We proxy 
loanable funds input by all types of loanable funds (total liabilities less other liabilities). Labor input is 
measured by the sum of wages, salaries, and benefits paid for the full-time employees on the payroll. 
Capital input is approximated by the book value of fixed assets, such as headquarter buildings, branch 
offices, furniture and fixtures, computing equipments, ATMs, etc used in the production of banking services. 
All bank variables are in annual terms expressed in thousands of inflation adjusted Ukrainian currency 
(UAH).8 Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of input and output data for the whole industry (All), different 
sizes of banks (Size) and ownership forms (Ownership). As can be seen from the table, all input and output 
metrics are increasing over time, apparently reflecting the growth of the economy and level of financial 
intermediation in the country. 
Discussion of the First Stage Empirical Results 
In this study, following Kyj and Isik (2008), we divide the total sample of banks into three group sizes - with 
equal number of observations according their total assets – small banks (SMALLB), medium banks 
(MEDIUMB), and large banks (LARGEB). We wished to have approximately an equal number of banks in 
each group because small sample size in a DEA study has the potential of yielding higher values of 
efficiency. Efficiency measures for each bank were obtained with relation to its own group (separate) 
frontier. Table 6 presents the mean values of separate frontier technical efficiency, (TE), pure technical 
efficiency, (PTE), and scale efficiency (SE) estimates, for each year from 1998 to 2003. When looking at 
the entire sample, the mean efficiency measures calculated relative to the separate frontiers average 0.618 
for TE, 0.741 for PTE, and 0.826 for SE. The mean technical efficiency (TE) scores over the six years 
range from a low 0.481 in 1999 to a high of 0.741 in 2003, pure technical efficiency (PTE) from a low of 
0.632 in 1999 to a high of 0.822 in 2003, and scale efficiency (SE) scores from a low of 0.766 in 1998 to a 
high of 0.891 in 2003.  Technical inefficiencies in the Ukrainian banking are driven more by poor 
management decisions (PTE) than operating at incorrect scale (SE), but the gap appears to be narrowing. 
Table 7 presents the TE, PTE, and SE for banks divided by size into small banks (SMALLB), medium 
banks (MEDIUMB), and large banks (LARGEB) groups. Based on these raw efficiency scores over the six 
years, large and medium banks appear to have become more technically efficient, pure technically efficient, 
and scale efficient. Whereas in 1998, large banks on average wasted 0.62 of their resources by 2003 they 
were wasting only 0.19 of their resources. On the other hand, in 1998 small banks on the average were 
wasting 0.47 of their resources and by 2003 they were still wasting 0.39 of their resources. Competition 
appears to have increased all three mean technical efficiencies for large and medium banks. Concentration 
in the Ukrainian banking system has decreased over the years. The top 10 banks held 60% of all bank 
assets in 1998 and 54% in 2003.  Empirical evidence shows that banks operating in less concentrated 
                                                             
7 Also, bad loans and off-balance sheet items can be added to the model to better explain the efficiency differentials across the banks, 
however, the insufficient data do not let us incorporate them into our analysis. Asides from them, future studies may also take into 
account state-debt holdings in explaining or measuring bank efficiency in Ukraine, as they are among the most important assets for 
some Ukrainian banks.   
8 The exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvna has been pegged to the US dollar over this period and inflation has been in the range 
from a high of 28.7 in 1999 to a low of 0.8 in 2002. 
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markets are more efficient (Berger and Hannan, 1998). The Russian bank crisis of 1998 appears to have 
had a short-lived effect on Ukrainian banks with efficiency scores for all three sized groups increasing after 
1999. 
Table 6: The anatomy of banking industry efficiency during transition in Ukraine – separate frontier 
 Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
1998      
TE 0.499 0.413 0.293 0.002 1.000 
PTE 0.647 0.629 0.296 0.060 1.000 
SE 0.766 0.857 0.242 0.012 1.000 
1999      
TE 0.481 0.396 0.282 0.005 1.000 
PTE 0.632 0.581 0.293 0.046 1.000 
SE 0.772 0.850 0.236 0.105 1.000 
2000      
TE 0.576 0.518 0.261 0.004 1.000 
PTE 0.720 0.692 0.253 0.120 1.000 
SE 0.799 0.868 0.204 0.009 1.000 
2001      
TE 0.692 0.680 0.229 0.195 1.000 
PTE 0.811 0.863 0.194 0.336 1.000 
SE 0.849 0.892 0.167 0.296 1.000 
2002      
TE 0.718 0.747 0.221 0.169 1.000 
PTE 0.816 0.867 0.200 0.177 1.000 
SE 0.878 0.929 0.145 0.369 1.000 
2003      
TE 0.741 0.785 0.222 0.085 1.000 
PTE 0.822 0.885 0.196 0.113 1.000 
SE 0.891 0.952 0.130 0.368 1.000 
All      
TE 0.618 0.621 0.273 0.002 1.000 
PTE 0.741 0.789 0.255 0.046 1.000 
SE 0.826 0.897 0.198 0.009 1.000 
 
Table 8 presents the results by ownership. Based on raw efficiency scores, foreign banks [FORBNK] seem 
to dominate local banks [DOMBNK] in terms of TE, PTE and SE. Among the foreign ownership forms, 
those banks with some local ownership (majority foreign banks [FORMAJ]) outperform purely foreign 
owned foreign banks (pure foreign banks [DOMPURE]); perhaps having a domestic partner helps these 
banks to eliminate some operational problems in a lesser known market.   
Table 9 exhibits the efficiency results by production location. The efficiency of a bank may be not 
determined primarily by how large its operations are or by who owns it, as the quality of its work force and 
economic conditions in its market area may be far more important to its success (Kyj and Isik, 2008). In 
other words, performance is substantially influenced by whether a bank operates in a major financial 
center, smaller city or rural area. In our sample, more than 50% of the banks in Ukraine are headquartered 
in the capital city Kiev.  
We have 11 distinct locations in Ukraine, 9 regions where major cities are located and 2 “dummy” regions, 
one that represents all the areas east of Kiev, other east, and one that captures the areas west of Kiev, 
other west. The results indicate that the banks headquartered in industrialized regions are more TE [64% 
vs 59%] and PTE [77% vs 70%] than those headquartered in rural regions. Among the 11 regions, the most 
TE, PTE and SE region is Donetsk [75%, 84%, and 88%], a major industrial area; the least TE and PTE 
region is Lviv [46% and 55%] and the least SE region is other east [78%], relatively rural regions.  
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Table 7: The anatomy of bank efficiency during transition by size - separate frontier 
 LARGEB  MEDIUMB  SMALLB  
  # Mean StdDev # Mean StdDev # Mean StdDev 
1998          
TE 48 0.381 0.255 49 0.590 0.256 48 0.525 0.329 
PTE 48 0.603 0.294 49 0.705 0.262 48 0.633 0.325 
SE 48 0.658 0.261 49 0.820 0.212 48 0.818 0.219 
1999          
TE 49 0.466 0.288 50 0.458 0.257 50 0.519 0.300 
PTE 49 0.694 0.274 50 0.569 0.257 50 0.632 0.334 
SE 49 0.675 0.273 50 0.812 0.206 50 0.827 0.196 
2000          
TE 48 0.631 0.225 49 0.512 0.254 49 0.587 0.290 
PTE 48 0.801 0.200 49 0.646 0.251 49 0.716 0.280 
SE 48 0.794 0.206 49 0.789 0.212 49 0.813 0.197 
2001          
TE 48 0.657 0.207 48 0.700 0.227 48 0.719 0.250 
PTE 48 0.789 0.187 48 0.805 0.202 48 0.838 0.194 
SE 48 0.833 0.152 48 0.864 0.151 48 0.851 0.196 
2002          
TE 49 0.795 0.128 49 0.764 0.178 50 0.598 0.278 
PTE 49 0.871 0.127 49 0.854 0.151 50 0.725 0.262 
SE 49 0.915 0.091 49 0.897 0.134 50 0.822 0.180 
2003          
TE 50 0.812 0.144 50 0.803 0.159 51 0.611 0.276 
PTE 50 0.865 0.139 50 0.878 0.128 51 0.725 0.257 
SE 50 0.941 0.083 50 0.912 0.098 51 0.822 0.164 
All          
TE 292 0.625 0.266 295 0.637 0.257 296 0.593 0.293 
PTE 292 0.771 0.231 295 0.742 0.241 296 0.711 0.285 
SE 292 0.804 0.220 295 0.849 0.179 296 0.825 0.191 
Both Donetsk and Kiev (although it includes the mining area), are not as depressed economically as the 
other regions. During this transition period there was a saying in Ukraine: “Look at Kiev separately from the 
rest of Ukraine”. Donetsk has a controlling clan of oligarchs, which has been very powerful in the 
government administration in the capital. The competition among banks headquartered in Kiev may drive 
PTE (managerial efficiency). Donetsk and Odessa also shoe- display more scale efficiency than Kiev. This 
is in line with the fact that Donetsk is the largest region by population, yet the number of banks 
headquartered in Donetsk is less than 10% of Kiev. According to learning by doing hypothesis, established 
banks are expected to dominate de novo banks in terms of performance (DeYoung and Hasan, 1998; Isik, 
2008; Isik and Topuz, 2016). In order to understand the effect of bank age and experience on bank 
efficiency, we constructed Table 9, which presents the mean efficiencies of Ukrainian banks by age. As the 
banks might not be in full operation in their first years after foundation, we extracted one-year-old banks 
from the analysis. According to learning by doing hypothesis, established banks are expected to dominate 
de novo banks in terms of performance (DeYoung and Hasan, 1998; Isik, 2008; Isik and Topuz, 2016). In 
order to understand the effect of bank age and experience on bank efficiency, we constructed Table 9, 
which presents the mean efficiencies of Ukrainian banks by age. As the banks might not be in full operation 
in their first years after foundation, we extracted one-year-old banks from the analysis. It is clear that most 
of the Ukrainian banks are relatively young; the oldest bank is just 15 years of age. The banks with the 
highest TE (73%), PTE (82%) and SE (90%) scores are 14 years old, while the banks with the lowest TE 
(52%), PTE (71%) and SE (70%) are 3 years old. Because, in addition to size, ownership, location, and 
age variables, there may be other factors involved at play, the efficiency differentials between these 
organizational forms will be further analyzed in the second stage analysis in a multivariate regression 
framework.  
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Table 8: The anatomy of bank efficiency during transition by ownership - separate frontier 
 Pure Domestic 
Banks[DOMPURE] 
[1] 
Majority Domestic 
Banks[DOMMAJ] 
[2] 
Majority Foreign 
Banks[FORMAJ] 
[3] 
Pure Foreign 
Banks[FORPURE] 
[4] 
Domestic Banks 
[DOMBNK] 
[1+2] 
Foreign Banks 
[FORBNK] 
[3+4] 
 # Mean StdDev # Mean StdDev # Mean StdDev # Mean StdDev # Mean StdDev # Mean StdDev 
1998                   
TE 111 0.492 0.286 5 0.465 0.201 2 0.504 0.409 6 0.528 0.335 118 0.485 0.284 8 0.522 0.323 
PTE 111 0.643 0.286 5 0.712 0.276 2 0.625 0.531 6 0.734 0.291 118 0.639 0.288 8 0.707 0.321 
SE 111 0.760 0.244 5 0.699 0.256 2 0.829 0.050 6 0.642 0.329 118 0.758 0.243 8 0.689 0.292 
1999                   
TE 115 0.482 0.264 8 0.321 0.168 2 0.567 0.613 7 0.517 0.357 124 0.476 0.265 9 0.528 0.378 
PTE 115 0.632 0.281 8 0.549 0.295 2 0.757 0.344 7 0.805 0.230 124 0.630 0.282 9 0.794 0.235 
SE 115 0.770 0.228 8 0.667 0.253 2 0.630 0.523 7 0.646 0.367 124 0.765 0.230 9 0.642 0.368 
2000                   
TE 120 0.562 0.254 8 0.502 0.224 3 0.691 0.345 6 0.646 0.341 128 0.558 0.252 9 0.661 0.321 
PTE 120 0.719 0.250 8 0.618 0.223 3 0.701 0.344 6 0.676 0.354 128 0.713 0.249 9 0.684 0.329 
SE 120 0.781 0.211 8 0.822 0.169 3 0.984 0.015 6 0.962 0.042 128 0.783 0.208 9 0.969 0.036 
2001                   
TE 121 0.691 0.228 9 0.597 0.257 3 0.700 0.203 6 0.741 0.228 130 0.685 0.231 9 0.727 0.208 
PTE 121 0.804 0.197 9 0.782 0.202 3 0.869 0.227 6 0.866 0.178 130 0.803 0.196 9 0.867 0.181 
SE 121 0.855 0.164 9 0.763 0.230 3 0.804 0.067 6 0.853 0.174 130 0.848 0.170 9 0.837 0.143 
2002                   
TE 131 0.708 0.222 7 0.802 0.167 4 0.821 0.099 6 0.767 0.312 138 0.713 0.220 10 0.789 0.241 
PTE 131 0.812 0.199 7 0.847 0.130 4 0.894 0.125 6 0.823 0.323 138 0.814 0.196 10 0.851 0.254 
SE 131 0.870 0.149 7 0.942 0.085 4 0.923 0.051 6 0.937 0.110 138 0.874 0.148 10 0.931 0.088 
2003                   
TE 131 0.738 0.219 5 0.727 0.178 6 0.867 0.114 7 0.792 0.320 138 0.733 0.219 13 0.826 0.241 
PTE 131 0.826 0.191 5 0.763 0.141 6 0.930 0.083 7 0.799 0.317 138 0.819 0.192 13 0.860 0.240 
SE 131 0.883 0.135 5 0.941 0.078 6 0.934 0.111 7 0.976 0.048 138 0.885 0.132 13 0.957 0.082 
All                   
TE 729 0.618 0.266 42 0.560 0.253 20 0.740 0.258 38 0.664 0.318 776 0.614 0.266 58 0.690 0.299 
PTE 729 0.744 0.247 42 0.707 0.234 20 0.831 0.235 38 0.785 0.275 776 0.740 0.248 58 0.801 0.260 
SE 729 0.823 0.196 42 0.799 0.213 20 0.879 0.172 38 0.835 0.253 776 0.822 0.197 58 0.850 0.227 
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Developments in Returns to Scale of the Transitional Banks in Ukraine 
Because scale inefficiency appears to be one of the major problems driving overall technical inefficiency of 
Ukrainian banks (by about 22%), it is worthwhile to focus on their returns to scale. Table 11 and 12 report 
the developments in the returns to scale of Ukrainian banks by size, ownership, and location. The law of 
diminishing returns refers to what occurs to output when a bank alters only one input, say labor or capital, 
and holds all other inputs constant. Whereas, returns to scale (RTS) tell us what happens to a bank’s 
output if all inputs are changed. Thus, we define RTS as the increases in output that result from increasing 
all inputs by the same percentage. Obviously, there are three possible cases: 1) increasing returns to scale 
(IRS) occurs when 1% increase in inputs produces more than 1% increase in outputs; 2) constant returns 
to scale (CRS) occur when 1% increase in inputs results in exactly 1% increase in outputs; and 3) 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS) happen when 1% increase in inputs leads to less than 1% increase in 
outputs. Because a bank’s cost curves are determined by its technology, whether a bank faces IRS, CRS, 
or DRS influences its long run costs. Economies of scale are present when, as output increases, long run 
average cost decreases. Whereas, diseconomies of scale are present, as output increases, long run 
average cost increases. Both IRS and DRS represent non-optimal output levels, thus scale inefficiencies. 
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Table 9: The anatomy of bank efficiency during transition by geographic location - separate frontier 
 
Cities Scores 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  All  
  # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean 
PANEL A.                
1. Kiev TE 72 0.468 74 0.464 75 0.603 75 0.711 77 0.734 79 0.759 452 0.626 
 PTE 72 0.639 74 0.642 75 0.740 75 0.834 77 0.835 79 0.833 452 0.756 
 SE 72 0.728 74 0.740 75 0.806 75 0.848 77 0.880 79 0.897 452 0.818 
2. Kharkiv TE 14 0.539 13 0.485 12 0.579 12 0.584 12 0.701 11 0.788 74 0.606 
 PTE 14 0.610 13 0.618 12 0.718 12 0.730 12 0.814 11 0.885 74 0.722 
 SE 14 0.828 13 0.750 12 0.767 12 0.792 12 0.849 11 0.879 74 0.810 
3. Donetsk  TE 6 0.701 7 0.645 7 0.630 8 0.818 8 0.866 9 0.784 45 0.748 
 PTE 6 0.840 7 0.773 7 0.735 8 0.884 8 0.938 9 0.852 45 0.841 
 SE 6 0.812 7 0.830 7 0.869 8 0.930 8 0.914 9 0.909 45 0.882 
4. Lviv TE 5 0.333 6 0.309 4 0.385 4 0.541 4 0.615 4 0.676 27 0.459 
 PTE 5 0.431 6 0.362 4 0.531 4 0.592 4 0.702 4 0.790 27 0.547 
 SE 5 0.822 6 0.871 4 0.829 4 0.915 4 0.888 4 0.851 27 0.862 
5. Crimea TE 7 0.564 8 0.521 8 0.493 5 0.736 5 0.647 6 0.759 39 0.603 
 PTE 7 0.730 8 0.610 8 0.722 5 0.750 5 0.729 6 0.799 39 0.717 
 SE 7 0.783 8 0.836 8 0.684 5 0.966 5 0.881 6 0.938 39 0.833 
6. Zaporizha TE 5 0.371 6 0.477 6 0.589 5 0.636 5 0.835 4 0.859 31 0.614 
 PTE 5 0.515 6 0.677 6 0.670 5 0.749 5 0.856 4 0.916 31 0.721 
 SE 5 0.796 6 0.662 6 0.903 5 0.873 5 0.976 4 0.926 31 0.849 
7. Politava TE 2 0.347 3 0.392 3 0.636 3 0.670 3 0.590 3 0.581 17 0.547 
 PTE 2 0.389 3 0.468 3 0.808 3 0.771 3 0.812 3 0.732 17 0.680 
 SE 2 0.882 3 0.841 3 0.804 3 0.847 3 0.771 3 0.784 17 0.818 
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Table 9 ( Cont’d): The anatomy of bank efficiency during transition by geographic location - separate frontier 
Cities Scor
es 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  All  
  # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean 
PANEL A.                
8. Odessa TE 9 0.561 10 0.613 9 0.595 9 0.718 9 0.674 9 0.711 55 0.645 
 PTE 9 0.679 10 0.690 9 0.688 9 0.829 9 0.756 9 0.738 55 0.729 
 SE 9 0.781 10 0.896 9 0.859 9 0.839 9 0.882 9 0.951 55 0.869 
9. Other east TE 6 0.483 5 0.399 5 0.399 5 0.656 4 0.579 5 0.610 30 0.518 
 PTE 6 0.653 5 0.461 5 0.637 5 0.886 4 0.695 5 0.727 30 0.675 
 SE 6 0.749 5 0.906 5 0.668 5 0.723 4 0.817 5 0.833 30 0.780 
10. Other west TE 7 0.602 6 0.384 6 0.454 7 0.607 8 0.627 8 0.593 42 0.553 
 PTE 7 0.731 6 0.554 6 0.554 7 0.780 8 0.727 8 0.737 42 0.689 
 SE 7 0.806 6 0.710 6 0.848 7 0.792 8 0.869 8 0.825 42 0.812 
11. Dnipropetrovsk TE 10 0.573 11 0.551 11 0.595 11 0.702 12 0.697 12 0.736 67 0.645 
 PTE 10 0.725 11 0.737 11 0.803 11 0.802 12 0.802 12 0.835 67 0.786 
 SE 10 0.811 11 0.779 11 0.738 11 0.882 12 0.861 12 0.877 67 0.826 
PANEL B.                
Industrialized  TE 88 0.496 92 0.488 93 0.604 94 0.719 96 0.738 100 0.759 563 0.638 
[1+3+11] PTE 88 0.662 92 0.663 93 0.747 94 0.834 96 0.838 100 0.835 563 0.766 
 SE 88 0.743 92 0.751 93 0.802 94 0.859 96 0.879 100 0.896 563 0.824 
Relatively rural TE 55 0.507 57 0.470 53 0.527 50 0.641 52 0.682 51 0.707 318 0.585 
[2+4+5+6+7+8 PTE 55 0.623 57 0.580 53 0.673 50 0.766 52 0.776 51 0.797 318 0.699 
+9+10] SE 55 0.802 57 0.805 53 0.792 50 0.832 52 0.875 51 0.881 318 0.830 
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Table 10: The anatomy of bank efficiency during transition by age - separate frontier 
 
Age Scores 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  All  
  # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean 
2 TE 10 0.599 5 0.644 1 0.403   . 4 0.986 5 0.769 25 0.696 
 PTE 10 0.728 5 0.781 1 0.574   . 4 1.000 5 0.863 25 0.803 
 SE 10 0.693 5 0.776 1 0.703   . 4 0.986 5 0.863 25 0.791 
3 TE 9 0.410 8 0.350 5 0.757 1 0.665   . 3 0.882 26 0.523 
 PTE 9 0.590 8 0.714 5 0.804 1 0.774   . 3 0.938 26 0.717 
 SE 9 0.684 8 0.453 5 0.932 1 0.859   . 3 0.932 26 0.696 
4 TE 7 0.631 9 0.463 9 0.627 5 0.883 1 0.753 1 1.000 32 0.637 
 PTE 7 0.686 9 0.630 9 0.672 5 1.000 1 0.853 1 1.000 32 0.730 
 SE 7 0.876 9 0.752 9 0.937 5 0.883 1 0.883 1 1.000 32 0.864 
5 TE 13 0.598 7 0.704 9 0.455 9 0.720 5 0.943 1 0.978 44 0.658 
 PTE 13 0.687 7 0.788 9 0.710 9 0.806 5 1.000 1 1.000 44 0.775 
 SE 13 0.885 7 0.905 9 0.668 9 0.894 5 0.943 1 0.978 44 0.854 
6 TE 36 0.560 14 0.420 8 0.774 10 0.714 9 0.680 3 0.929 80 0.603 
 PTE 36 0.657 14 0.518 8 0.933 10 0.879 9 0.778 3 0.930 80 0.712 
 SE 36 0.832 14 0.807 8 0.817 10 0.816 9 0.878 3 0.999 80 0.835 
7 TE 26 0.462 36 0.592 15 0.480 7 0.826 10 0.766 7 0.675 101 0.581 
 PTE 26 0.677 36 0.724 15 0.651 7 0.940 10 0.827 7 0.779 101 0.730 
 SE 26 0.693 36 0.811 15 0.736 7 0.876 10 0.922 7 0.859 101 0.788 
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Table 10 (Cont’d): The anatomy of bank efficiency during transition by age - separate frontier 
Age Scores 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  All  
  # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean 
8 TE 28 0.401 26 0.461 33 0.748 16 0.727 5 0.766 9 0.772 117 0.601 
 PTE 28 0.575 26 0.605 33 0.844 16 0.811 5 0.844 9 0.874 117 0.724 
 SE 28 0.718 26 0.821 33 0.886 16 0.894 5 0.911 9 0.888 117 0.833 
9 TE 8 0.463 28 0.380 24 0.525 32 0.801 16 0.693 5 0.710 113 0.595 
 PTE 8 0.550 28 0.539 24 0.714 32 0.881 16 0.795 5 0.758 113 0.720 
 SE 8 0.856 28 0.725 24 0.717 32 0.903 16 0.863 5 0.930 113 0.812 
10 TE 7 0.392 8 0.445 24 0.442 23 0.648 33 0.771 15 0.730 110 0.620 
 PTE 7 0.678 8 0.580 24 0.586 23 0.814 33 0.840 15 0.809 110 0.746 
 SE 7 0.672 8 0.779 24 0.783 23 0.803 33 0.918 15 0.896 110 0.836 
11 TE   . 7 0.319 11 0.526 22 0.589 24 0.637 33 0.760 97 0.632 
 PTE   . 7 0.501 11 0.672 22 0.699 24 0.763 33 0.835 97 0.744 
 SE   . 7 0.720 11 0.787 22 0.840 24 0.838 33 0.889 97 0.841 
12 TE   .   . 7 0.448 12 0.567 21 0.658 24 0.689 64 0.630 
 PTE   .   . 7 0.635 12 0.737 21 0.797 24 0.778 64 0.761 
 SE   .   . 7 0.764 12 0.749 21 0.828 24 0.878 64 0.825 
13 TE   .   .   . 7 0.463 12 0.608 32 0.729 51 0.664 
 PTE   .   .   . 7 0.604 12 0.755 32 0.820 51 0.775 
 SE   .   .   . 7 0.793 12 0.814 32 0.879 51 0.852 
14 TE   .   .   .   . 7 0.759 4 0.687 11 0.733 
 PTE   .   .   .   . 7 0.844 4 0.772 11 0.818 
 SE   .   .   .   . 7 0.902 4 0.892 11 0.898 
15 TE   .   .   .   .   . 6 0.715 6 0.715 
 PTE   .   .   .   .   . 6 0.762 6 0.762 
 SE   .   .   .   .   . 6 0.931 6 0.931 
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The results indicate that over the mid-transition period, 67% of the Ukrainian banks analyzed/included in 
sample have experienced DRS, 23% IRS, and 10% CRS. These results are indicating that regardless of 
size, location, and time, the vast majority of banks are operating at a non-optimal production point in their 
long run average cost curve in terms of inputs savings (either DRS or IRS) and suffering mainly from 
overproduction. It is clear that if these banks double their input sources, their outputs will less than double. 
It may be that the Ukrainian public with historical mistrust issues with banks favor large banks and bring 
about overcapacity in those banks. These results and existence of substantial number of banks in Ukraine 
with respect to other transition countries may mean that Ukraine is an over-banked market. One policy 
implication is that most Ukrainian banks may reap cost and input savings provided that they lower their 
production scales or if there were  fewer banks in the system. Consolidation between non-large banks may 
yield the same desired efficiency gains. Policy makers may encourage mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
between banks with DRS and banks with IRS as large banks with excess capacity may eliminate the idle 
capacity in smaller banks.  
Table 11: The anatomy of banks’ return to scale during transition by size & ownership - separate frontier 
Groups RTS 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
All         
 CRS 16 15 17 11 15 14 88 
 DRS 97 84 80 92 118 123 594 
 IRS 32 50 49 41 15 14 201 
 Total 145 149 146 144 148 151 883 
Size         
LARGEB CRS 6 3 2 2 3 4 20 
 DRS 39 39 44 46 46 46 260 
 IRS 3 7 2 0 0 0 12 
 Total 48 49 48 48 49 50 292 
MEDIUMB CRS 4 6 6 4 4 1 25 
 DRS 36 21 23 32 43 47 202 
 IRS 9 23 20 12 2 2 68 
 Total 49 50 49 48 49 50 295 
SMALLB CRS 6 6 9 5 8 9 43 
 DRS 22 24 13 14 29 30 132 
 IRS 20 20 27 29 13 12 121 
 Total 48 50 49 48 50 51 296 
Ownership         
DOMPURE CRS 11 10 13 10 13 12 69 
 DRS 79 66 61 73 105 106 490 
 IRS 21 39 46 38 13 13 170 
 Total 111 115 120 121 131 131 729 
DOMMAJ CRS 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
 DRS 5 6 7 7 5 5 35 
 IRS 0 2 1 1 1 0 5 
 Total 5 8 8 9 7 5 42 
FORMAJ CRS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 DRS 2 2 3 3 4 6 20 
 IRS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Total 2 2 3 3 4 6 20 
FORPURE CRS 1 1 2 0 1 2 7 
 DRS 4 6 4 6 4 4 28 
 IRS 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 
 Total 6 7 6 6 6 7 38 
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Table 12: The anatomy of bank return to scale in during transition by location - separate frontier 
City RTS 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
1.Kiev CRS 8 9 9 5 8 8 47 
 DRS 47 45 47 54 62 62 317 
 IRS 17 20 19 16 7 9 88 
 Total 72 74 75 75 77 79 452 
2. Kharkiv CRS 3 1 3 1 1 1 10 
 DRS 8 5 5 7 11 10 46 
 IRS 3 7 4 4 0 0 18 
 Total 14 13 12 12 12 11 74 
3. Donetsk CRS 2 1 1 3 2 1 10 
 DRS 3 4 2 4 6 7 26 
 IRS 1 2 4 1 0 1 9 
 Total 6 7 7 8 8 9 45 
4. Lviv DRS 5 4 3 3 4 4 23 
 IRS 0 2 1 1 0 0 4 
 Total 5 6 4 4 4 4 27 
5. Crimea CRS 0 2 1 0 0 1 4 
 DRS 5 3 3 2 4 5 22 
 IRS 2 3 4 3 1 0 13 
 Total 7 8 8 5 5 6 39 
6. Zaporizha CRS 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 DRS 4 3 5 4 5 4 25 
 IRS 1 2 1 1 0 0 5 
 Total 5 6 6 5 5 4 31 
7.Politava DRS 2 2 2 2 3 3 14 
 IRS 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 
 Total 2 3 3 3 3 3 17 
8. Odessa CRS 1 1 0 0 2 1 5 
 DRS 7 6 5 4 6 7 35 
 IRS 1 3 4 5 1 1 15 
 Total 9 10 9 9 9 9 55 
9. Other east DRS 4 1 1 2 4 5 17 
 IRS 2 4 4 3 0 0 13 
 Total 6 5 5 5 4 5 30 
10. Other west CRS 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
 DRS 6 5 0 2 5 7 25 
 IRS 1 1 5 5 2 1 15 
 Total 7 6 6 7 8 8 42 
11.Dnipropetrovsk CRS 2 0 2 2 1 2 9 
 DRS 6 6 7 8 8 8 43 
 IRS 2 5 2 1 3 2 15 
 Total 10 11 11 11 12 12 67 
 
Discussion of the Second Stage Empirical Results 
The variations of efficiencies (inefficiencies) across banks may be associated with factors that affect 
competition or create different environments under which banks operate; therefore, we examine what 
factors relate to the degree of efficiency (inefficiency). We use the conventional procedure. A point estimate 
of efficiency is obtained for each bank and then the estimated efficiency is regressed on/or correlated with 
a set of variables representing factors that may affect the efficiency (inefficiency) level. Because 
heteroscedasticity can emerge when estimated parameters are used as dependent variables, we do not 
apply ordinary least squares (OLS) (Saxonhouse, 1976). We follow Mester (1993) and Isik and Hassan 
(2003) and run generalized least squares (GLS) multiple regressions utilizing estimates of various 
efficiency (EFF) measures obtained in stage one as the dependent variables. Table 13 displays the multi-
variate regression results for Model 1 (a more parsimonious form) and Model 2 (a more detailed form) for 
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robustness check. Model statistics for multivariate regressions such as R-square, F-value and Durbin-
Watson (DW) are also presented in the table.9 The independent variables are grouped into five main 
categories: 1) economic environment, 2) production scale, 3) ownership structure, 4) production location, 
and 5) other bank traits.  
EFFi = a0 + a1Yr99 +a2Yr00 + a3Yr01 + a4Yr02 + a5Yr03 + a6MEDIUMB + a7LARGEB + a8FORBNK + 
a9IndCities + a10Ages-10 + a11Ages-15 + a12SecTA + a13NonDepTA + a14FeeIncTA + a15EqTA + 
a16MarPower + a17ProdDiv + ℮ 
Dummy variables Yr99, Yr00, Yr01, Yr02, and Yr03 (Yr98 is excluded as the base year) are used to 
account for the changes in the banking environment. The year variables basically represent the non-crisis 
years during which the economy grew and more years in the transition stage. All managerial efficiency 
indexes, TE, PTE, and SE, appear to have increased significantly, particularly so after 1999.  During the 
1990s a number of business schools were established in Ukraine and foreign governments and 
supranational organizations sponsored overseas training programs for young Ukrainian managers. 
Ukrainian economy turned around in 2000 and started to grow, when then led to positive impacts on bank's 
productive performance. As discussed in detail above, theoretically, larger banks might be more efficient 
since they may be able to hire a better management team, might be more closely monitored by their 
owners, and may be located in larger more competitive markets. Small banks may be inefficient because 
they operate under increasing returns to scale and may need to grow to reap economies of scale (Isik et al; 
2016a,b).  
Table 13. The anatomy of correlates of banking efficiency during transition – separate frontier 
 TE   PTE   SE   
MODEL 1. coeff. t-stat p-value coeff. t-stat p-value coeff. t-stat p-value 
Constant  1.005 0.315  4.064 0.000  13.882 0.000 
Yr99 0.035 0.944 0.346 0.041 1.050 0.294 0.026 0.612 0.541 
Yr00 0.228 5.877 0.000 0.213 5.278 0.000 0.136 3.121 0.002 
Yr01 0.410 10.141 0.000 0.373 8.882 0.000 0.227 4.998 0.000 
Yr02 0.501 11.829 0.000 0.437 9.916 0.000 0.298 6.259 0.000 
Yr03 0.620 13.678 0.000 0.526 11.165 0.000 0.362 7.111 0.000 
MEDIUMB 0.283 6.801 0.000 0.247 5.719 0.000 0.154 3.289 0.001 
LARGEB 0.347 6.636 0.000 0.295 5.430 0.000 0.180 3.058 0.002 
FORBNK -0.030 -0.941 0.347 -0.037 -1.132 0.258 0.012 0.326 0.744 
Indust. Cities 0.020 0.671 0.503 0.043 1.375 0.169 -0.026 -0.768 0.443 
Age6-10 -0.073 -1.661 0.097 -0.086 -1.880 0.060 0.024 0.497 0.619 
Age11-15 -0.158 -3.129 0.002 -0.161 -3.075 0.002 -0.037 -0.658 0.511 
SecTA 0.287 9.586 0.000 0.223 7.156 0.000 0.210 6.242 0.000 
NonDepTA 0.251 7.284 0.000 0.250 6.963 0.000 0.045 1.153 0.249 
FeeIncTA 0.024 0.816 0.415 0.018 0.598 0.550 0.036 1.105 0.270 
EqTA 0.392 8.052 0.000 0.426 8.423 0.000 0.070 1.276 0.202 
MarPower -0.003 -0.085 0.932 0.232 6.704 0.000 -0.249 -6.644 0.000 
ProdDiv -0.112 -3.689 0.000 -0.096 -3.066 0.002 -0.083 -2.443 0.015 
R2 0.341  0.000  0.288 0.000  0.168 0.000 
MODEL 2. coeff. t-stat p-value coeff. t-stat p-value coeff. t-stat p-value 
Constant  2.033 0.042  4.900 0.000  13.125 0.000 
Yr99 0.044 1.193 0.233 0.048 1.247 0.213 0.029 0.686 0.493 
Yr00 0.243 6.188 0.000 0.224 5.472 0.000 0.142 3.199 0.001 
Yr01 0.427 10.274 0.000 0.387 8.919 0.000 0.230 4.877 0.000 
Yr02 0.515 11.788 0.000 0.448 9.831 0.000 0.295 5.957 0.000 
Yr03 0.628 13.741 0.000 0.533 11.176 0.000 0.351 6.769 0.000 
                                                             
9 Some panel data techniques, such as fixed effect or random effect models, may be employed to help better control for potential 
heterogeneity bias or the confounding effects of omitted variables that are stable over time. Taking this view into account, we have 
also run such models for robustness analysis. We observed that the results are fairly stable across models. For space, we have not 
reported those results. However, they are available from the authors upon request.   
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Table 13 (Cont’d): The anatomy of correlates of banking efficiency during transition – separate frontier 
 TE   PTE   SE   
MEDIUMB 0.300 7.037 0.000 0.262 5.891 0.000 0.169 3.503 0.000 
LARGEB 0.354 6.621 0.000 0.303 5.429 0.000 0.193 3.179 0.002 
DOMMAJ -0.071 -2.444 0.015 -0.058 -1.897 0.058 -0.038 -1.160 0.246 
FORMAJ 0.020 0.692 0.489 0.021 0.689 0.491 0.004 0.121 0.904 
FORPURE -0.064 -2.008 0.045 -0.067 -2.019 0.044 -0.004 -0.104 0.917 
Kharkiv 0.034 1.111 0.267 0.022 0.693 0.488 -0.010 -0.297 0.767 
Donetsk 0.070 2.351 0.019 0.050 1.616 0.107 0.051 1.503 0.133 
Lviv -0.038 -1.283 0.200 -0.079 -2.520 0.012 0.066 1.934 0.053 
Crimea -0.019 -0.634 0.526 -0.023 -0.722 0.471 0.002 0.072 0.943 
Zaporizha -0.016 -0.554 0.579 -0.022 -0.705 0.481 0.005 0.141 0.888 
Politava -0.013 -0.453 0.650 -0.007 -0.246 0.806 -0.002 -0.058 0.954 
Odessa 0.053 1.757 0.079 0.010 0.331 0.741 0.083 2.439 0.015 
OthEast -0.037 -1.289 0.198 -0.022 -0.724 0.469 -0.021 -0.632 0.527 
OthWest -0.013 -0.429 0.668 -0.016 -0.505 0.614 0.014 0.400 0.689 
Dnipropet. 0.015 0.508 0.612 0.016 0.517 0.605 0.024 0.721 0.471 
SecTA 0.284 9.325 0.000 0.216 6.802 0.000 0.215 6.225 0.000 
NonDepTA 0.245 7.016 0.000 0.247 6.791 0.000 0.039 0.973 0.331 
FeeIncTA 0.013 0.436 0.663 0.009 0.305 0.760 0.033 1.014 0.311 
EqTA 0.386 7.830 0.000 0.424 8.248 0.000 0.068 1.222 0.222 
MarPower 0.008 0.230 0.818 0.241 6.915 0.000 -0.248 -6.556 0.000 
ProdDiv -0.115 -3.734 0.000 -0.097 -3.015 0.003 -0.090 -2.556 0.011 
Age -0.140 -3.592 0.000 -0.134 -3.298 0.001 -0.031 -0.709 0.479 
Adj-R2 0.354  0.000 0.297  0.000 0.169 0.000  
DW 1.694   1.579   1.783   
#  883   883   883   
 
Earlier studies on US banks have produced conflicting results. Cebenoyan et al. (1993), Mester (1993), 
Mester (1996), Berger and Hannan (1998), and Chang et al. (1998) did not find a significant relation 
between efficiency and bank size. Aly et al. (1990) found a significant relationship between size and pure 
technical efficiency yet no significant results for overall, technical, or allocative efficiencies. Berger et al. 
(1993) found scale efficiency, and Miller and Noulas (1996) found a positive relation between size and 
efficiency. Studies have also found significant negative relation between size and efficiency (Hermalin and 
Wallace (1994); DeYoung and Nolle (1996). Isik and Hassan (2003) found that medium Turkish banks are 
both more PTE and SE than small and large ones.10 We first ranked the Ukrainian banks according to their 
total assets, and then divided them into three equal size categories (in terms of number of observations): 
small banks, SMALLB (excluded from the regressions as the base group), medium banks, MEDIUMB, and 
large banks, LARGEB. Dummy variables were used to present bank size to allow for nonmonotonicity and 
nonlinearities in the relationship between size and efficiency. The results indicate that larger banks (both 
medium and large) are more technically, pure technically, and scale efficient than small banks. The 
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) defines four different sizes of banks. For a robustness check, the results 
were rerun with the National Bank of Ukraine’s classification of small (SMALLB-NBU), medium (MEDIUMB-
NBU), large (LARGEB-NBU) and huge (HUGEB-NBU) banks, as presented in Table 14. No differences 
were noted in the three efficiency scores between medium and small banks, and huge and small banks, but 
large banks were significantly more pure technically efficient and less scale efficient. All of the system 
banks are in the huge bank category. The results suggest that their special relation with the government 
provides them with monopoly power that may allow them to use too much input per unit of output.  
 
                                                             
10 Mertens and Urga (2001) found that for 1998 small banks in Ukraine were more cost efficient, but less profit efficient than large and 
medium banks. Small banks also operated under significant economies of scale, while large and medium ones operate under 
diseconomies. 
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Table 14: The anatomy of correlates of bank efficiency by NBU size variables – separate frontier 
 TE   PTE   SE   
MODEL 1. coeff. t-stat p-value coeff. t-stat p-value coeff. t-stat p-value 
Constant  4.264 0.000  7.201 0.000  16.341 0.000 
Yr99 0.019 0.483 0.629 0.023 0.585 0.559 0.022 0.527 0.598 
Yr00 0.205 5.059 0.000 0.180 4.316 0.000 0.141 3.169 0.002 
Yr01 0.415 9.341 0.000 0.375 8.161 0.000 0.231 4.739 0.000 
Yr02 0.495 10.426 0.000 0.437 8.914 0.000 0.286 5.480 0.000 
Yr03 0.614 12.393 0.000 0.515 10.074 0.000 0.362 6.669 0.000 
MEDIUMB-NBU 0.104 2.509 0.012 0.068 1.583 0.114 0.080 1.765 0.078 
LARGEB-NBU 0.120 2.694 0.007 0.137 2.969 0.003 0.008 0.168 0.867 
HUGEB-NBU -0.072 -1.332 0.183 0.033 0.590 0.555 -0.149 -2.501 0.013 
FORBNK -0.021 -0.643 0.521 -0.036 -1.063 0.288 0.024 0.677 0.498 
Indust. Cities 0.032 1.025 0.305 0.051 1.610 0.108 -0.018 -0.529 0.597 
Age6-10 -0.093 -2.068 0.039 -0.107 -2.312 0.021 0.019 0.376 0.707 
Age11-15 -0.178 -3.453 0.001 -0.188 -3.531 0.000 -0.037 -0.654 0.513 
SecTA 0.280 9.128 0.000 0.216 6.836 0.000 0.206 6.120 0.000 
NonDepTA 0.227 6.413 0.000 0.222 6.066 0.000 0.040 1.025 0.306 
FeeIncTA 0.020 0.688 0.492 0.017 0.550 0.583 0.032 0.985 0.325 
EqTA 0.230 5.287 0.000 0.285 6.363 0.000 -0.019 -0.409 0.683 
MarPower 0.115 2.142 0.032 0.249 4.470 0.000 -0.093 -1.565 0.118 
ProdDiv -0.125 -4.042 0.000 -0.106 -3.321 0.001 -0.093 -2.733 0.006 
R2 0.308  0.000 0.263  0.000 0.167  0.000 
MODEL 2. coeff. t-stat p-value coeff. t-stat p-value coeff. t-stat p-value 
Yr99 0.026 0.675 0.500 0.030 0.747 0.455 0.024 0.557 0.578 
Yr00 0.218 5.327 0.000 0.191 4.527 0.000 0.143 3.171 0.002 
Yr01 0.430 9.450 0.000 0.390 8.270 0.000 0.228 4.532 0.000 
Yr02 0.509 10.435 0.000 0.452 8.962 0.000 0.277 5.139 0.000 
Yr03 0.620 12.428 0.000 0.524 10.142 0.000 0.346 6.254 0.000 
MEDIUMB-NBU 0.101 2.445 0.015 0.066 1.536 0.125 0.080 1.743 0.082 
LARGEB-NBU 0.118 2.636 0.009 0.138 2.979 0.003 0.005 0.095 0.924 
HUGEB-NBU -0.056 -1.032 0.302 0.050 0.885 0.376 -0.144 -2.393 0.017 
DOMMAJ -0.050 -1.670 0.095 -0.044 -1.434 0.152 -0.020 -0.603 0.547 
FORMAJ 0.023 0.758 0.449 0.020 0.626 0.532 0.012 0.349 0.727 
FOPURE -0.047 -1.442 0.150 -0.061 -1.798 0.073 0.016 0.455 0.649 
Kharkiv 0.043 1.376 0.169 0.029 0.911 0.363 -0.005 -0.134 0.893 
Donetsk 0.087 2.842 0.005 0.067 2.135 0.033 0.057 1.697 0.090 
Lviv -0.043 -1.394 0.164 -0.079 -2.481 0.013 0.059 1.740 0.082 
Crimea -0.018 -0.588 0.557 -0.019 -0.588 0.557 -0.001 -0.030 0.976 
Zaporizha 0.002 0.079 0.937 -0.004 -0.132 0.895 0.014 0.426 0.670 
Politava -0.022 -0.759 0.448 -0.015 -0.502 0.616 -0.007 -0.225 0.822 
Odessa 0.026 0.847 0.397 -0.013 -0.410 0.682 0.068 1.993 0.047 
OthEast -0.047 -1.597 0.111 -0.029 -0.944 0.345 -0.029 -0.867 0.386 
OthWest -0.031 -1.011 0.312 -0.029 -0.908 0.364 0.000 0.007 0.995 
Dnipropet. -0.007 -0.216 0.829 -0.001 -0.047 0.963 0.011 0.323 0.746 
SecTA 0.272 8.722 0.000 0.206 6.381 0.000 0.208 6.012 0.000 
NonDepTA 0.221 6.129 0.000 0.218 5.856 0.000 0.035 0.869 0.385 
FeeIncTA 0.008 0.274 0.784 0.007 0.238 0.812 0.028 0.849 0.396 
EqTA 0.218 4.950 0.000 0.277 6.079 0.000 -0.028 -0.570 0.569 
MarPower 0.111 2.065 0.039 0.244 4.383 0.000 -0.097 -1.629 0.104 
ProdDiv -0.125 -3.941 0.000 -0.102 -3.110 0.002 -0.099 -2.815 0.005 
Age -0.153 -3.790 0.000 -0.158 -3.785 0.000 -0.023 -0.514 0.608 
Adj-R2 0.319   0.271   0.166  0.000 
 
Isik et al. / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 5 No 3, 2016  
ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Pa
ge
26
 
Except for the two state banks, Oshchadny Bank (savings) and UkrExImbank (foreign trade), all banks are 
considered private banks. Four of the private and the two state banks are system banks as explained 
previously. As mentioned, UkrExImbank is not included in our sample. Although 114 of the private banks 
that operate are open stock companies and the others are closed stock companies, there is no structural 
difference between them since in the sample period none were publicly traded. For ownership structure, we 
consider domestic versus foreign ownership.  Most of the early studies on domestic versus foreign bank 
profitability and cost efficiencies considered the US banking system. Early studies addressing scale and 
scope did not find significant differences in performance between domestic-owned and foreign-owned 
banks in the US (Houpt, 1983; Goldberg, 1982). Studies found that foreign-owned banks in the US had 
lower costs of capital and lower costs of funds (Zimmer and McCauley, 1991; McCauley and Seth. 1992; 
Terrel, 1993). Studies concentrated on the US banking system found domestic US banks to be more 
efficient than foreign-owned banks in the US (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Mahajan et al. 1996; Chang et al. 
1998). Foreign banks appeared to trade efficiently for market share in the US. Studies on emerging 
countries have found foreign banks to be more efficient. Isik and Hassan (2002 and 2003) found that in 
Turkey foreign private banks are significantly more efficient than private domestic banks, but that public 
banks dominate both private domestic and private foreign. 
The results from the studies on cost efficiency in European transition economies vary. Kraft and Tirtiroglu 
(1998) and Matousek and Taci (2002) did not find foreign banks in Croatia or in the Czech Republic, 
respectively, to be more cost efficient than domestic-owned banks. Hasan and Marton (2001) found foreign 
banks in Hungary to be significantly more profit efficient than domestic banks. Hungary’s banking system is 
dominated by foreign capital with over 75% of the banks being foreign owned. Fries and Taci (2005), 
investigating 15 Central and Eastern European transition economies, found that the privatized majority 
owned foreign banks are more cost efficient than newly established foreign and domestic banks, with 
privatized majority domestic-owned banks being the least cost efficient. We divide Ukrainian banks into two 
categories and four sub-categories: DOMBNK, domestic ownership (DOMPURE, pure domestic and 
DOMMAJ, majority domestic), and FORBNK, foreign ownership (FORPURE, pure foreign and FORMAJ, 
majority foreign). Domestic ownership or pure domestic are used as the base dummy variables, 
respectively.  
We find no significant differences in technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
between domestic ownership and foreign ownership after controlling for other factors. When ownership is 
broken down into pure domestic, majority domestic, majority foreign, and pure foreign, majority domestic 
ownership appears to be significantly more technically and purely technically inefficient than pure domestic 
ownership. This may be as a result of a conflict between organizational culture of domestic managers (who 
are also usually domestic owners) and foreign owners. Purely foreign owned banks, which serve mostly 
foreign investors and do not compete with the local banks tend to also have lower TE and PTE, most likely 
due to information problems. As discussed, the efficiency of a bank may be not determined primarily by 
how large its operations are or by who owns it, as the quality of its work force and economic conditions in 
its market area may be of far greater importance to its success. To investigate the impact of geography on 
bank performance, we categorize bank headquarters by regions where major cities are located and where 
at least two banks were headquartered. Accordingly, we identified 11 districts in the country, with Kiev 
dummy being the base case. Multivariate regressions of efficiency indicate that pure technical efficiency in 
Lviv is negatively correlated with Kiev. Donetsk, a major industrial area, has a significantly positive 
correlation.  
The composition of bank assets and liabilities and other bank traits may also play a role in defining bank 
efficiency. Therefore, we included the ratio of securities to total assets (SecTA), nondeposits to total assets 
(NonDepTA), fee income to total assets (FeeIncTA), equity to total assets (EqTA), market share 
(MarPower), product diversification (ProdDiv) and age to control for other factors that may drive bank 
efficiency. Security investment (SecTA): Banks whose assets are substantially skewed towards 
investment securities can be found to be more technically efficiency than those investing mostly in loans as 
production of securities investment demands less labor and capital when compared to loans. Consistent 
with such expectations, we found that banks carrying relatively greater investment portfolio tends to have 
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more TE, PTE, and SE scores. Use of purchased funds (NonDepTA): In addition, as a funding and 
liability management strategy, banks that proportionately make additional use of non-deposit sources can 
save substantially from capital and labor expenses and in turn may record higher technical efficiency. Retail 
banks that dominantly rely on core deposits to finance their assets should operate large branch networks 
and employ a larger workforce, which may raise overhead costs and lower technical efficiency. 
Accordingly, our results indicate that banks that utilize more purchased funds and less deposits are more 
technically and pure technically efficient.  
Producing fee income (FeeIncTA): In recent years, banks have tried to diversify their revenue sources to 
rely less on interest income, which is very volatile and cyclic. Modern banks have discovered new ways to 
generate fee income such as foreign exchange trading commissions, fiduciary income, service charges on 
transaction deposits, money transfer, financial advising, securities underwriting, etc. Such non-traditional 
banking services can be provided using the same facilities and personnel allocated to traditional banking, 
which would increase the productivity and efficiency of factor inputs. Our results generally indicate a 
positive but statistically insignificant relationship between efficiency and fee income. Capitalization 
(EqTA): The equity ratio measures both how well capitalized and how risky the banks are. Insolvency risk 
rises for banks with thinner capital cushion. The moral hazard problem postulates that with little investment 
stake to lose, owners of less capitalized firms tend to have less incentive to control and monitor 
management, aggravating agency costs and inefficiency in banks. Empirical studies usually report that well 
capitalized banks are more efficient (Berger and Mester, 1997). Our results confirm those earlier studies 
from other countries. The well-capitalized Ukrainian banks tend to significantly outclass less capitalized 
Ukrainian banks in terms of both TE and PTE. This finding may be associated with the lack of trust in 
commercial banks in the country. Because equity serves as collateral in the event of bank failure, the public 
chooses to bank with capitally strong banks to reduce the risk of their savings loaned to these financial 
institutions.  
Market power (MarPower): Market structure may be important in defining banking efficiency, as well. The 
Cournot model of oligopolistic behavior predicts that market power be positively related to profitability and 
efficiency, as banks with market power can charge higher prices, deter competition and transform more 
outputs per inputs (Berger 1995; Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003; Isik et al., 2016a,b). We 
use market share of the bank in total assets of the industry (MarPower) to measure market power. Our 
results suggest that banks with greater market power seem to be significantly more pure technically 
efficient (PTE). Banks with greater market share tend to have lower scale efficiency. Evidently, their larger 
size results in decreasing returns to scale as most of the large banks in Ukraine were found to be suffering 
from excess production.  
Product diversification (ProdDiv): Product diversity may result in higher operation efficiencies. Factors of 
production might be shared by several outputs; for example, a bank teller might serve both checking and 
saving accounts customers. Likewise, excess capacity on the bank’s processing devices (i.e., computers) 
may help the bank enhance the scope of products it produces as well as its scale. Nevertheless, there 
might be a critical point at which scale diseconomies appear (i.e., producing many products increases the 
bank’s unit costs). Having different product lines might require complicated hierarchical management 
structures and organizational forms that can increase the bank’s costs and agency problems. There are a 
number of empirical studies, which investigated the impact of product diversity on efficiency. Aly and et al. 
(1990) found that product diversity is negatively related to cost (overall), allocative (AE), technical (TE), and 
pure technical (PTE) efficiencies of the US banks. Similarly, Ferrier et al. (1993) found that banks with 
greater product diversity tended to have lower cost efficiency. Also, in this line, Chaffai and Dietsch (1995) 
compared the efficiency of universal (less specialized) banks with that of non-universal (more specialized) 
banks in Europe and found that the former is less cost efficient than the latter. Likewise, Isik and Hassan 
(2003) reported a negative relationship between product diversification and efficiency for Turkish banks. On 
the contrary, DeYoung (1994) found that banks shifting from making bank loans to producing a broader mix 
of services experienced higher (not lower) efficiency. Our results imply that banks with greater 
diversification tend to have significantly lower TE, PTE, and SE. These results are consistent with the 
Isik et al. / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 5 No 3, 2016  
ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Pa
ge
28
 
majority of outcomes/findings from previously conducted studies. It seems that there are significant scope 
diseconomies (as well as scale diseconomies) in Ukrainian banking.  
Bank Age (Age): In order to assess the role of bank age and experience on efficiency, we divided 
Ukrainian banks into three categories according to length of their existence: 2-5 years (Age2-5 being the 
base dummy variable), 6-10 years (Age6-10), and 11 to 15 years (Age11-15). The results from both Model 
1 and Model 2 suggest that there is a significant negative association between technical efficiency and 
bank age. The older the banks are (both Age6-10 and Age 11-15), the less efficient they are, contradicting 
the findings of DeYoung and Hassan (1998) on US banks and confirming the findings of Isik (2008) on 
Turkish banks and the findings of Isik and Topuz (2016) on US REITs. New banks in Ukraine are coming 
into a more saturated competitive market, which is relationship based due to the basic mistrust of bankers 
that resulted from the inflation that wiped out savings in the years of transition. With the large number of 
banks, declining interest rates, and competition becoming fiercer as banks aggressively pursue the limited 
number of Ukrainian credit worthy companies, new banks must be more efficient to survive in this 
increasingly competitive market. 
Conclusion 
The transition from a command economy to a market economy has been difficult for Ukraine. With low 
external investment, most of the investment capital has been domestic. Since its independence in 1991, 
over 300 banks have been registered in Ukraine. These banks serve different functions; have different 
operating characteristics – scale, legal treatment, goal, technology, organization, culture, etc. Some of 
them are universal; others serve only their owners or western firms. Employing a highly flexible non-
stochastic frontier approach, using three separate frontiers for three different sized groups, large, medium 
and small, we estimate technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, and scale efficiency, and consider the 
impact of size, ownership, location, age, and other bank traits on these efficiency measures. 
We find that although Ukrainian banks are relatively inefficient, their efficiency scores have increased 
significantly after the early years of transition, following Russia’s debt moratorium and at the beginning of 
the new millennium. We also find that scores for large and medium banks have increased more than for 
small banks. Although all banks in Ukraine are very small by international standards, their relative size in 
Ukraine affects their efficiencies. Administrative and compliance requirements during the sample period 
resulted in voluminous documentation and red tape. The lack of trust of the populace that had lost 
everything in the early nineties has created a situation where expansion in the banking system could occur 
only through more staff and more physical structures. The mentality of overstaffing and over-employment 
still remains when no outside competition forces it to change. Although  there are a relatively large number 
of banks in Ukraine with respect to other transition countries, the lack of strong foreign participation in the 
banking sector did not create a competitive climate that would lead to greater efficiency.  
Ukraine may be overbanked because it appears to have too many undercapitalized and very small banks 
providing a plethora of services. To compete with the multinational banks that will inevitably come, large 
Ukrainian banks can grow by acquiring small banks that operate under increasing returns to scale. In doing 
so, large banks can transfer their better pure technical efficiency (managerial know-how) to their 
acquisitions. Likewise, small banks with their idle capacity and increasing returns to scale can trim the “fat” 
(excess scale) from the large acquirers. A similar policy recommendation from an earlier paper on 
Ukrainian banking (Mertens and Urga, 2001) supports the consolidation or downsizing requirement in this 
emerging economy. The results also indicate that in areas where few banks exist, pure technical efficiency 
is significantly lower, competition is weak and infrastructure is poor. Most banks in Ukraine are 
headquartered in the capital city Kiev. A substantial number of banks are headquartered in several of 
regions outside of Kiev. However, the branches of banks headquartered in other regions service more than 
ten of the twenty-five regions. In Ukraine, a headquartered bank invests on the average about 121 million 
UAH in the region where it is headquartered, but only 32 million UAH in the region where its branch is 
located (Patrikatz and Krochmaluk, 2004). Therefore, further geographic diversification of banks might not 
only increase scale efficiency but also economic development. 
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It should be noted that this paper is exploratory in nature for transitional banks. Thus, future papers on 
Ukrainian banking can be improved upon in several ways. They may apply a different efficiency technique, 
such as stochastic frontier approach, SFA, to the same data set to see if the results are robust against 
different assumptions. Likewise, given the input price data availability, other efficiency concepts, such as 
price efficiency or profit efficiency, can be computed to see how optimally Ukrainian banks choose the mix 
of inputs factors given their prices (allocative/price efficiency) and how effectively they control costs and 
boost earnings at the same time (profit efficiency). Also, reflecting the nature of modern banking today, off 
balance sheet activities can be incorporated into the measurement of efficiency when the data becomes 
available. Furthermore, our results reveal marked differences in average efficiency over time, thus the 
association between external factors and bank efficiency can be investigated further and closely by using 
macroeconomic variables such as GNP growth, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, etc. Our results 
also signify some market power. Hence, future researchers can examine the impact of market structure in 
general and the degree of competition in particular on efficiency more thoroughly. This can be achieved by 
employing either traditional measures such as concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
or a more recent approach by Panzar and Rosee (1987). In addition, taking into account the shifts in 
production frontier over time, a more appropriate dynamic analysis of efficiency increase and technical 
progress in Ukrainian banking can be accomplished using the Malmquist-type total factor productivity 
change indexes.     
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